It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Two-sided matching markets are markets each player has preferences over being matched to players on the other side. In this paper (Ashlagi, Braverman and Hassidim (2010) ) we study many-to-one matching markets, in which one side of the market contains couples. Examples for such markets are the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) and the clearinghouse for psychology interns. In our model one side of the market consists of hospitals and the other consists of doctors, who can either be singles or part of a couple.
Naturally, when couples are present in the market, the preferences of the individuals within each couple depend on each other and often introduce complementarities, and a stable matching may not exist Roth (1984) . Klaus and Klijn (2005) provided a maximal domain of preferences for which a stable matching exists. However, Kojima, Pathak, and Roth (2010) observe from real data that couples' preferences often do not belong to this domain. Adopting a random preferences approach, they use a simple algorithm to show that * A full version of this paper is available at http://web.mit.
Copyright is held by the author/owner(s). EC'11, June 5-9, 2011, San Jose, California, USA. ACM 978-1-4503-0261-6/11/06. if there are n single doctors, and the number of couples is of order √ n a stable matching exists with probability converging to one as n approaches infinity. Real data, however, suggests that the number of couples is larger than √ n. We introduce a new matching algorithm, called Sorted Deferred Acceptance (SoDA). We first show that if the number of couples grows at a near-linear rate 1 , the probability that a stable matching exists and that the SoDA algorithm will find one approaches one as n grows. Furthermore, truthtelling is an approximated Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the game induced by SoDA. We then show that if the number of couples grows linearly there exist a constant probability that a stable matching does not exist.
We also show that the SoDA algorithm runs in polynomial time (in fact 'almost' linear), and provide simulations that test SoDA in various large random markets.
At the technical level, we aim to control the way in which complementarities introduced by couples may interfere with each other thus precluding a stable matching from being found. We introduce a notion of an "influence tree" that gives an upper bound on the range of the effect a particular couple may have. By analyzing the (typical) relationship between the influence trees of the couples, we are able to devise a way to produce a stable matching with high probability when the number of couples is sub-linear.
Our results add to a short list of positive results in setting with complementarities. We believe our techniques maybe useful in other such settings.
